澳洲广播电台第十二集：国际舞台上的澳大利亚(页 1) - 澳洲留学移民 - 澳大利亚广播电台 -

澳洲广播电台第十二集：国际舞台上的澳大利亚

这一集介绍了英国曾如何扮演了澳大利亚的“宗主国”这一角色；第二次世界大战之后美国怎样扩大了在澳的影响；以及目前澳大利亚与亚洲诸国的关系。该集还探讨了这些关系如何左右了澳大利亚的外交政策。

[color=Red]详细内容请看二,三,四楼[/color]

中文详细内容
[quote]
（插播音乐：格伦·米勒和现代乐队的《嘘，这是军事机密》，选自专辑《战时歌声》）

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

大家好，我是苏·斯拉梅，欢迎收听系列节目“今日澳洲”。

今天的节目是“国际舞台上的澳大利亚”，我们将探讨一下二战后影响澳大利亚外交政策的种种因素……

[b]插播战时广播：[/b]

我们打断这个节目，插播来自合众社的重要新闻。华盛顿快讯：白宫宣布日本军队偷袭了珍珠港，请别换台，继续关注事态的发展……

[b]富兰克林·罗斯福：[/b]

日本对马来亚、泰国和美利坚合众国不宣而战。我们已被卷入这场战争，这将是美国历史上最为壮烈的一页。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

一九四一年十二月八日，日本战机轰炸了停泊在珍珠港的美国太平洋舰队。美国被迫卷入二战，从此，澳大利亚与美国和亚洲的接触更加密切。

日本发动突然袭击时，澳大利亚大部分军事力量都部署在欧洲和地中海地区。

英国曾向澳大利亚保证，驻扎在新加坡海军基地的英军将会捍卫大英帝国安全。但珍珠港事件后不久，日军就向新加坡节节逼近。

[b]温斯顿·丘吉尔：[/b]

我的英国同胞们、澳大利亚和新西兰的人民——你们的安危牵动着我们的心，还有印度和缅甸的挚友，勇敢的荷兰和中国盟友们，以及身在美国的亲友们，今晚，我要对笼罩在这场惨痛的军事失败阴影下的人们说，我们大英帝国打了败仗：新加坡沦陷了。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

下面有请墨尔本拉特罗布大学的历史学家戴维·戴，他将回顾当时工党领袖约翰·柯廷如何力主澳大利亚实行独立自主的国防政策，因为如果遭遇双面夹击，英国将无法顾及澳大利亚了。

[b]戴维·戴：[/b]

防卫问题是一九三七年选举的中心议题。柯廷在选举中打出了国防王牌，认为澳大利亚在国防方面必须依靠自己。但是这种自我保护的政策最终并没有实行。新加坡在柯廷心中的份量依然很重，他对英国仍存有某些幻想。所以，当‘威尔士亲王号’和‘驱逐号’分别在一九四一年的十一、十二月被调到远东时，柯廷认为这就是英国承诺过的远东舰队的先遣队。他就是这么认为的，觉得英国人正在履行他们的诺言，而这也正是他后来失望之处。后来在十二月珍珠港被袭，紧接着马来亚也遭入侵，这使得他大失所望，不得不转向美国求援。直到那时，他才终于意识到，英国根本不可能对澳大利亚的防务有求必应。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

戴维·戴在他的《战争的手腕》一书中所提供的资料显示了英国和澳大利亚对这场战争所作的最坏打算最终变成了现实，那就是这场战争在欧洲和太平洋两个战场上同时展开。

考虑到日本有可能对马来亚发动进攻，英国派遣了一艘航空母舰来支援皇家海军，但是这艘航母却没有及时赶到新加坡。

贝内特中将是澳大利亚的战时司令，他曾在一九四五年说，澳大利亚的防务太过于依赖英国及其新加坡的军事基地。

[b]贝内特中将：[/b]

新加坡军事基地被视为英国势力在远东的象征，其战略重要性得到广泛的认可。当英国人得知那仅仅只是一个海军基地，没有任何陆地防御工事时，难怪他们会感到震惊不已。那里竟没有构筑任何抵御北方进攻的工事。日本人正是看准了这一点，因此从北面发动进攻。记得那天傍晚巡视澳大利亚防线时，我感受到在战斗中我们士兵的内心深处是何等的绝望。他们当时为了遏制敌人的攻势，在没有空中支援的情况下，浴血奋战，最终寡不敌众，伤亡惨重。这些不幸的士兵成为了我们备战不力的牺牲品。我们应该预见到战争会爆发，但我们却忽略了备战工作，士兵们为此付出了惨重的代价。我们也必须永远铭记，如果没有美利坚合众国参战，战争将会旷日持久，损失惨重；事实上，没有他们援助，我们很难打赢这场战争。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

澳大利亚在国防上不能再对英国抱有幻想，这促使澳大利亚认识到亚洲和太平洋地区的重要性，并要加强同美国这一在亚太地区最具影响的强国间的关系。

﹙到了五十年代，“东南亚条约组织”和“澳新美联盟”的崛起，取代了日渐衰落的大英帝国。﹚

甚至在战争结束之前，印度尼西亚的民族主义分子就宣布印度尼西亚脱离荷属东印度群岛而独立。这是对澳大利亚与亚洲邻国关系的第一次考验，也是影响澳大利亚外交决策的关键事件。

[b]戴维·戈兹沃西：[/b]

有史以来第一次，我们卷入了一个亚洲国家的重大政治纷争之中，这个国家与澳大利亚近在咫尺。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

戴维·戈兹沃西教授是《面向北方》一书的编者，这套书共两卷，记录了澳大利亚与亚洲交往的历史。

[b]戴维·戈兹沃西：[/b]

二十世纪四十年代末，当时的奇弗利政府深深地卷入了处理印尼民族主义和独立问题的漩涡。到四十年代末，印尼已经独立，而我们卷入印尼问题的程度是如此之深，以至于它在后来很长的时间里影响着我们对亚洲的理解。这不仅是我们第一次介入亚洲近邻的事务，而且总体上我们是站在亚洲这一边而不是在欧洲这一边来参与处理这一问题的，这的确是史无前例的。所以，我觉得对于当时的澳大利亚来说，这是一次难得的学习经历。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

在你看来，是因为这是荷属殖民地，所以我们的态度就有所不同吗？假如是英属殖民地，你觉得澳大利亚会依然保持这种支持独立的立场吗？

[b]戴维·戈兹沃西：[/b]

问得很好，不过这个问题也很难回答。我觉得我们很有可能会支持英国，就像以前在二十世纪四十年代末马来半岛爆发独立运动时那样。关键是，当时马来半岛的斗争是反对共产党的叛乱。无论是从战略上还是战术上来讲，马来亚对我们都十分重要。战后马来亚对我们的重要性和以往一样没有减弱，英国重新部署了一定兵力，驻兵新加坡和马来亚。我们需要马来亚作为我们的安全屏障，来保持和英国的联系。有必要说清楚的是，虽说在四十年代末我们支持印度尼西亚反对荷兰，但我们是在帮英国，而不仅仅是支持，是在不断提供更多的帮助。因此，在二十世纪五十年代初期和中期，澳大利亚军队实际上一直在全力以赴保卫英国的马来亚。我们知道马来亚要独立，但至少它要按照英国的方式独立，总体上我们赞同这种做法。但是，这并不是说我们强烈支持马来半岛或者后来的新加坡民族主义者，来反对殖民主义。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

一九六三年，联合国宣布了马来西亚的成立，由马来半岛与三个北婆罗洲地区以及新加坡联合组成。

这一决议激起了邻国印度尼西亚的强烈不满与谴责。印度尼西亚的总统苏加诺宣布了他针对所谓“新殖民主义结构”的“对抗政策”。

美国不同意由英联邦来负责马来西亚的防卫，因为美国的首要目标是维持一个稳定的、非共产主义的印度尼西亚。

因此，当英国寻求澳大利亚的军事支持来保护马来西亚时，澳大利亚便处于两难境地。它想保持对英国的忠诚，但是它又不能确定，一旦澳大利亚和印度尼西亚在马来西亚的问题上发生军事冲突，美国是否会向澳大利亚提供援助。

[b]戴维·戈兹沃西：[/b]

对于澳大利亚来说，这的确是第一个实战演习亚洲外交政策的机会，非常微妙，也是一次很好的学习经历。虽然我们同意在军事上支持英国保护马来西亚，虽然在冲突期间，澳大利亚和印度尼西亚的军队真的在北婆罗洲出现了对峙，但是我们成功了，灵活机智地化险为夷，成功地维持了与印度尼西亚的外交关系。这一切可能要归功于当时的外交部长加菲尔德·巴瑞克的个人外交能力。澳大利亚政府是有分工的，我们的首相罗伯特·孟席斯主要负责与英国的关系，还有与美国关系中的一些事务。五十年代我们有像凯西这样的外交部长，六十年代有巴瑞克，他们对亚洲重要事务都比较了解，并竭尽全力促使本国外交在这一地区正常运转。刚刚你还提到了美国，如果我们在马来西亚陷入困境，他们并不一定会帮助我们。我们也不对美国抱有太高的期望，因为从二十世纪六十年代起，美国的全部精力就都放在了越南以及附近的东南亚地区。他们当然还希望西方国家以及澳大利亚都能够参加越战，帮助他们。最终我们还是答应了美国加入越战，而英国却断然拒绝了，因为他们不想卷进这场战争。尽管早在六十年代中期，美国总统约翰逊就对英国首相威尔逊说过一句十分有名的话，那就是‘即使英国派遣的是一个排的风笛手，我们也不在乎，只要在越战中有英国国旗在飘扬就足够了’。然而威尔逊甚至连一队风笛手也不愿意派，但是我们澳大利亚还是同意了派兵。所以在一九六五年到一九六六年之间，澳大利亚一方面派军队到马来西亚援助英国，与此同时还出兵越南援助美国。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

一九六六年，澳大利亚总理哈罗德·霍尔特在和美国总统林登·巴恩斯·约翰逊的一次对话中表明了澳大利亚愿意加入越战的态度。

[b]林顿·巴恩斯·约翰逊:[/b]

作为一个总理，你在华盛顿发表演讲时谈到了我们的勇士们在遥远的前线出生入死，你象征性地表示愿与我林顿·巴恩斯·约翰逊一起共度难关。听到你这番话，没有一个美国人会觉得这是什么新闻。（鼓掌）

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

那么为什么澳大利亚会如此心甘情愿地参加越战呢？

莫纳什大学的政治历史学家保罗·斯特兰吉奥解释说，这是冷战思维产生的结果。

[b]保罗·斯特兰吉奥：[/b]

澳大利亚人总认为亚洲邻国有许多麻烦，尤其是在位于澳大利亚北方的国家里，因为战后那儿的局势动荡不安。他们都是所谓的庞大共产主义阵营的成员，这也正是以美国为首的西方国家想要遏制的。对此，澳大利亚也忧心忡忡，担心这个地区会倒退到十九世纪。而且二战后，动乱迭起，中国成为了共产主义国家，尤其是印度尼西亚在苏加诺的领导下也逐渐转向共产主义。面对这些问题，我们的忧虑更是与日俱增。有麻烦的国家和地区如此之多，我们真害怕他们会形成一个铜墙铁壁般的共产主义阵营，因此必须在某个环节上阻止它的形成。于是到二十世纪六十年代初，越南就成了划定分水岭的地方。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

你是说澳大利亚曾一直把希望寄托在繁荣富强的美国朋友身上，指望他们为我们提供在亚太地区的安全屏障？

[b]保罗·斯特兰吉奥：[/b]

没错，但事先得说明一下，不是当时的澳大利亚政府讨好美国，盲目追随美国，事情没有那么简单。澳大利亚在非公开的场合积极鼓励美国卷入越战，深层次的原因是，当时的政府坚信，只有让美国介入澳大利亚和亚洲之间的事务才能确保其安全，因此任何能够促使美国加强在这一地区的战略、军事以及经济利益的事件，对我们来说都是好事。所以在二十世纪六十年代初，我们积极支持美国不断介入越南问题。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

您正在收听的是澳洲广播电台的系列节目“今日澳洲”。今天播出的是第十二期——国际舞台上的澳大利亚。

一九七二年，高夫·惠特拉姆领导的工党在大选中获胜。这促使澳大利亚最终从越南撤军，并且开始采取相对独立的外交政策。

保罗·斯特兰吉奥将继续和我们讨论这个话题……

[b]保罗·斯特兰吉奥：[/b]

一九七一年，理查德·尼克松总统宣布了所谓的“尼克松主义”，明确指出：一，在可预见的未来，美国不太可能在亚洲大陆采取任何军事行动；二，亚洲国家和亚太地区在防卫上要更加独立自主。澳大利亚促使美国卷入越战的宗旨是确保该地区的安全，而尼克松却正在打退堂鼓；其次，当时美国与中国的关系变得日益融洽。惠特拉姆政府正是在这一背景下开始执政的，他们审时度势，为澳大利亚的外交政策开辟了新的方向。这些新方向时常会引起澳大利亚与美国关系的紧张，虽然并不一定是严重的冲突。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

保罗·斯特兰吉奥来自莫纳什大学，他曾为高夫·惠特拉姆的副总理兼贸易部长吉姆·凯恩斯撰写传记——《信仰守望者》。

一九七一年，高夫·惠特拉姆成为第一位访问北京的澳大利亚政治领袖。次年，澳大利亚与中国建立了外交关系。虽然早在十九世纪，澳大利亚和中国就有羊毛和粮食的贸易往来，这种贸易关系在二十世纪七十年代初又重新恢复和发展起来。

一九七三年，高夫·惠特拉姆再次访问北京……

[b]高夫·惠特拉姆：[/b]

在国际关系上，澳大利亚正朝着新的方向发展。这一点在澳大利亚与亚洲的关系上尤为突出，毫无疑问澳大利亚属于这个地区。我们选择的道路业已畅通，我们也将始终不渝地走下去。我们不再仅仅关注地球另一端的某些特定国家，而是要关注世界上所有的国家，尤其关注那些和我们共享同一环境，存在共同利益，并且能够与我们平等相处的国家。我们将致力于这样一种对外关系：不会因过于重视与某些国家的关系而影响了与自己邻国的正常交往。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

所以是否是八十年代冷战的结束和“亚洲四小龙”的崛起迫使澳大利亚将其注意力由“战场”转向“市场”？

戴维·戈兹沃西，请您接着谈谈这一点……

[b]戴维·戈兹沃西：[/b]

可以这么说，如果没有以“四小龙”为代表的亚洲经济腾飞，澳大利亚可能不会对亚洲那么感兴趣。在二十世纪的八、九十年代，经济外交在这个全球化的时代里显得异常重要；这与五、六十年代冷战时期我们从安全、战略的角度出发看待亚洲截然不同。顷刻之间，世界变得纷繁复杂起来，你得面对全球化，面对由于种种原因而迅速崛起的“亚洲四小龙”，面对冷战的结束。所有这一切史无前例地让澳大利亚和其他国家视野大开，经济和贸易将成为国家交往的重心所在。你可能会简单说，长期以来，冷战思维一直左右着我们对亚洲的看法，亚洲在我们眼里是就一个战场。在这个战场里，我们和其他西方国家并肩作战，同共产主义国家交锋，尽管我们在西方国家阵营里处于从属位置，我们毫无疑问是其中的一员。而到了八、九十年代，所有这一切都结束了，“战场”开始向“市场”转变，亚洲国家成了我们的贸易伙伴。你可能说，事情就是这样，我觉得有点简单化，但从广义上来说，这种转变已成为事实。即便如此，任何一个政府，不仅仅是澳大利亚政府，或者说澳大利亚现政府，会完全放弃安全和战略上的考虑。在恐怖主义越来越猖獗的今天，世界其它地区仍存在武装冲突的危险，我们当然感觉到了安全和战略防御在我们外交政策中的极端重要性。这些因素，对一个国家的对外关系来说依然是至关重要的。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

当“9·11”恐怖袭击发生时，澳大利亚总理约翰·霍华德正在美国访问……

[b]总理约翰·霍华德：[/b]

“9·11”是决定性的事件。这个事件表明，恐怖分子掌握了骇人听闻且可任其支配的资源和手段，他们能够异常精确地夺走无数的生命。我们曾经相信我们有能力以自由开放的方式生活在这个世界上，但这场袭击的阴谋策划者不仅要粉碎我们的这一信仰，还要摧毁世界经济的基础。所以，包括澳大利亚在内的整个世界必须对此作出反应。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

虽然澳大利亚举国上下都和总理霍华一样对“9·11”恐怖袭击事件进行了严厉谴责，但十八个月后，政府追随美英加入伊拉克战争却引起了包括前外交官在内的澳大利亚人的不安和担忧。

理查德·伍尔科特曾经担任七位澳前总理和十二位前外交部长的顾问，而且在一九八八到一九九二年间担任澳外交贸易部秘书长。

理查德·伍尔科特的自传《炙手可热的职位》回顾了澳大利亚自从一九五二年以来外交政策的变迁，特别是记录了与亚洲的交往。

理查德·伍尔科特担心，澳大利亚政府突然投靠美国的政策，进一步加深了亚洲国家的看法，即澳大利亚是英美在这个地区的前哨，很难与亚洲融洽相处。

[b]理查德·伍尔科特：[/b]

我经常在亚洲国家旅行。我觉得亚洲人越来越倾向于认为，澳大利亚正以某种方式从贯穿二十世纪八十年代和九十年代初期的与多数东亚国家建立的密切的建设性关系中退出。我想这有多方面的原因。其中之一就是，我们重新调整了外交政策，进一步与美国政策保持一致，澳大利亚决定向伊拉克派兵就是一个极好的例子。我们派兵了，同时派兵的只有美国自己和英国。这产生了两方面的结果，一个结果是，这也许加深了原先固有的一种观点，那就是，我们确实是英美的一个前哨，与我们所在的这个地区无法融洽相处。我认为这非常令人遗憾。另一一个结果也许缺乏事实根据，那就是，有些人认为澳大利亚的作法是一种反伊斯兰行径。

[b]艾利森·布罗诺斯基：[/b]

我同意迪克的观点，当然这并不是因为他曾经是我的上司。刚才他谈到的这种亚洲对澳大利亚的印象由来已久，实际上始于二十世纪四十年代。当时，澳大利亚由于与美国和英国的盟国关系而拒绝参加不结盟运动。在亚洲，这种澳大利亚亲英美的看法被不断强化。可以这么说，最主要的原因可能是长期以来，我们一直坚持让美国军事力量介入亚洲事务。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

艾利森·布罗诺斯基曾担任外交官，任使馆文化参赞。他撰写的《面孔——亚洲人眼中的澳大利亚》在理查德·伍尔科特的自传发行后不久出版。

[b]艾利森·布罗诺斯基：[/b]

“9·11”事件显然对当时身在纽约的霍华德总理震动极大，但是，他并没有必要搬出澳新美联盟条约来，也没有必要告诉美国说，无论结局如何，我们将与你们并肩作战，尽一切所能，与卑鄙的敌人斗争到底。他其实用不着这样做，澳新美条约并没有对这一类义务作出规定。第二，明确针对澳大利亚和其他西方国家游客的巴厘岛爆炸事件，本来给我们提供了一个取消当时已经作出的出兵伊拉克承诺的绝好良机。我们本可以告诉美国，你们要理解我们现在的艰难处境，我们受到的威胁近在咫尺，情况非常棘手，如果处理不当，可能会给我们带来更加严重的后果，危及澳大利亚民众的生命安全，恶化我们与邻国的关系。我们完全可以对美国说，我们可不想背上侵略伊斯兰国家的恶名；因此显而易见，我们不想把一个两千人的小部队派到伊拉克去，反正你也不会因为这个而战败，因为从一开始美国就已经稳操胜券了。迪克实际上曾在其他场合指出过，我们完全可以在必要和合适的时候，理直气壮地向盟友表明我们的不同意见。

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

我来概括一下，您是否认为澳大利亚巩固与美英等国联盟的决策确实带来了新的问题，那就是如果将来出现类似的情况，亚洲国家的领导人会质疑澳大利亚独立自主地与亚洲交往的能力？

[b]艾利森·布罗诺斯基：[/b]

我可以肯定他们会这样怀疑。事实上，我认为我们已经向亚洲各国明确表示我们会怎样作，这个信息传达给了本地区的每个国家。在本地区的一些国家，像新加坡、汉城和东京，他们已经认可了我们的态度。但在另外一些国家却不尽然。当然，对于同一问题，不同国家有不同的观点。然而就澳大利亚的独立性而言，我认为所有的亚洲人肯定都认为我们已经毫无自己的立场可言。事实上我知道在联合国情况的确是这样的，人们会问，嘿，澳大利亚到哪里去了？澳大利亚曾经一度发出了自己独立的声音，至少在许多问题上有自己的立场。但现在看来，我们已经完全放弃了这个特点。”

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

今天参与我们节目的嘉宾是前外交官艾利森·布罗诺斯基，著有《面孔——亚洲人眼中的澳大利亚》一书。

在下周的节目中，澳大利亚总理约翰·霍华德将会参与到一个特殊的“问答时段”节目中来。他将在国会大厦外接受一群澳大利亚和美国高中学生的提问，内容是关于“9·11”事件之后的世界形势。

（学生提问场面的剪辑片断）

[b]学生：[/b]

总理先生，我问您的第一个问题是……

[b]学生：[/b]

这是否引起了您在道义上的担忧呢？

[b]学生：[/b]

您是否感到应对此负一些责任呢……

[b]学生：[/b]

您当时感想如何呢？

[b]学生：[/b]

您为什么选择了……

[b]学生：[/b]

当时您受到哪些道德问题的困扰呢？

[b]苏·斯拉梅：[/b]

下周再见。我是苏·斯拉梅，感谢赖安·厄甘为我们提供技术支持，感谢莫纳什大学全国澳大利亚研究中心提供的学术建议。
[/quote]

英文详细内容
[quote]
(Music: Shh, It's A Military Secret by Glen Miller and The Modernaires from the album Hits Of The War Years)

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Hello Sue Slamen with you for our series AUSTRALIA NOW.

Today in 'AUSTRALIA's PLACE IN THE WORLD' we look at the forces that have shaped foreign policy-making since the Second World War…

[b]WAR BROADCAST:[/b] "We interrupt this broadcast to bring you this important bulletin from the United Press … FLASH… Washington, the White House announces Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, stay tuned to W OR for further developments…"

[b]FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:[/b] "Japan has attacked Malaya and Thailand and the United States without warning. We are now in this war, all the way, the most tremendous undertaking of our American history."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] When Japanese warplanes bombed the US Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbour on the 8th of December, 1941, it brought America into the Second World War and it accelerated Australia's engagement with both Asia and the United States, thereafter.

At the time of Japan's surprise attack most of Australia's forces were deployed in Europe and the Mediterranean.

But Britain had assured Australia that its naval base in Singapore would be there to defend the Empire. Soon after Pearl Harbour though, Japan's forces made rapid advances towards Singapore.

[b]WINSTON CHURCHILL:[/b] "Tonight I speak to you at home, I speak to you in Australia and New Zealand for whose safety we will strain every nerve. To our loyal friends in India and Burma, to our gallant allies, the Dutch and Chinese, and to our kith and kin in the United States, I speak to you all under the shadow of a heavy and far-reaching military defeat. It is a British and imperial defeat. Singapore has fallen."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Historian, David Day from Melbourne's La Trobe University recalls how the Labor Leader John Curtin had argued that Australia should become more self-reliant because in the event of a two-pronged war, Britain would not be able to come to Australia's aid.

[b]DAVID DAY:[/b] "It was central to the 1937 election, Curtin went to the election fighting it on defence policy saying that Australia had to defend itself. But that fending for itself didn't happen, but nevertheless Singapore still bulked large in Curtin's mind, and he couldn't help himself keep a certain amount of faith in Britain. So when the Prince of Wales and Repulse was sent out to the Far East in November, December 1941, Curtin saw it as the first echelon of this Far East fleet that Britain had always promised. He thought it was, you know the promise was being made good, and so that was part of his disappointment. Later on in December after Pearl Harbour was attacked and Malaya was invaded, that was the reason for his disappointment and for his turning to America. It was only then that he realised that Britain wouldn't be springing to Australia's defence."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] In his book, THE POLITICS of WAR, David Day documents how Britain and Australia's worst case scenario became a reality with war on two fronts in both Europe and the Pacific.

In anticipation of a Japanese attack on Malaya, Britain had despatched an aircraft carrier to support the Royal Navy but it didn't reach Singapore in time.

Australian wartime commander, Lieutenant-General Bennet told the nation in 1945, that Australia had been too complacent in relying on Britain and its base in Singapore for its defence.

[b]LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BENNET:[/b] "Singapore had been regarded as a symbol of Britain's might in the Far East. Its strategic importance was recognised by all. Naturally British people were shocked to learn it was merely a naval base lacking any fortifications on the landward side. It lacked defences against any attack from the north. The Japanese therefore aimed their blow from that direction. I remember touring the Australian lines late that afternoon, and I realised then the heartbreaking disappointment of our men who had fought magnificently and suffered heavy casualties in their endeavour to check the enemy's advance. They were too few in numbers. They lacked aerial support. These unfortunates are the victims of our unpreparedness for this war, the price they paid for our neglect to prepare for the war, which we could see was coming. We must never forget that but for the United States of America the war would have been long and costly, in fact one wonders if we could have won it without their aid."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] The revelation that Australia could no longer look to Britain for its security led Australia to assert the importance of Asia and the Pacific and to forge closer relations with the United States; the major power in the Region.

(By the fifties, The Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation and the Australia, New Zealand, United States Alliance, or ANZUS, emerged to replace the waning British presence.)

An early test of Australia's dealings with its Asian neighbours came when Indonesian nationalists declared independence from the Dutch East Indies even before the war was over: it was a pivotal event for Australian foreign policy-making…

[b]DAVID GOLDSWORTHY:[/b] "This was the first time we'd found ourselves involved in a major political dispute, in an Asian country, and it was right next door to us."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Professor David Goldsworthy, who's the Editor of a two-volume history of Australian engagement with Asia titled "FACING NORTH".

[b]DAVID GOLDSWORTHY:[/b] "The government of the day, which was the Chifley government of the late 1940s, was thoroughly embroiled in the issue of what to do about Indonesian nationalism and independence. And by the end of the 1940s when Indonesia had become independent, we had become so involved in this issue that it coloured our understanding of Asia for a long time to come. Not only were we involved in an Asian issue for the first time and so close to home, we were involved in it broadly speaking on the side of the Asian party, not the European party, and that really was unprecedented. So that was a very significant I suppose learning experience for Australia at the time.

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Do you think though it made all the difference that it was a Dutch colonial possession? Had it been a British colonial possession do you think Australia would have taken the same pro-independence stance?

[b]DAVID GOLDSWORTHY:[/b] That's a very good question and again a complicated one. I think we would have been very likely to have supported the British as we did say in Malaya, where an independence movement of a kind was taking place also from the late 1940s. Importantly the fighting in Malaya was against a communist insurgency, and Malay mattered to us tactically and strategically. After the war Malaya was just as important to us as it had been before the war in the sense that the British were back in some force and stationed in Singapore and Malaya. So that was security blanket stuff for us to retain the link with the British in Malaya. And it's right to make this distinction, even as we supported Indonesia against the Dutch in the late 40s, we were helping the British, not just supporting them, but increasingly helping them, and so by the early and then the middle 1950s we were actually committing Australian troops to the defence of British Malaya. We knew Malaya was going to become independent, but at least it would be under British terms, and on the whole we would go along with those. But you couldn't say we were siding strongly with the nationalists in Malaya or for that matter, Singapore, against the colonial power."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] In 1963 the United Nations declared the formation of Malaysia by linking Malaya with the three North Borneo territories and Singapore into a federation.

The announcement provoked hostile condemnation from neighbouring Indonesia with President Sukarno declaring his policy of Confrontation against what he described as 'a neo-colonialist structure'.

The United States had not agreed to underwrite the British Commonwealth's defence of Malaysia, regarding the preservation of a stable, non-communist Indonesia as its primary objective.

So when Britain sought Australia's military support to defend Malaysia, Australia was in an invidious situation. It wanted to stay loyal to Britain but it wasn't sure whether the U.S would come to its aid in the event of any direct military conflict with Indonesia over Malaysia.

[b][b]DAVID GOLDSWORTHY:[/b][/b] "This might have been really the first really delicate exercise in Asian diplomacy for Australia, a strong learning experience. We pulled it off, we managed to do the trick, even though yes we agreed to support Britain militarily to defend Malaysia, even though Australian and Indonesian troops actually confronted each other in North Borneo at one stage of the conflict. We managed to maintain the relationship with Indonesia. A lot of this you would have to say was owed to the personal diplomacy of Garfield Barwick, who was our external affairs minister at the time. There was a bit of division of labour in the Australian government, you would have Robert Menzies, the prime minister looking after the British connection, to a degree the American, you would have a foreign minister like Casey in the 50s or Barwick in the 60s, with a much better understanding of the Asian imperatives and doing their best to keep diplomacy on track in that region. Now you also mentioned the United States, if we were in trouble in Malaysia they wouldn't necessarily come to our help. Well you could hardly expect them to, from the early 1960s America was overwhelmingly preoccupied with Vietnam as far as Southeast Asia was concerned. They were also looking of course to Western countries to join them in fighting the Vietnamese war, including Australia. We eventually said yes, the British emphatically said no, they would not get involved in Vietnam, even though President Johnson said to Prime Minister Wilson of Britain in the middle 60s, he famously said, look, send a platoon of bagpipers, I don't care what you send as long as there's a British flag in Vietnam. Wilson would not even send a platoon of bagpipers. But we agreed. So by 1965-66, Australia simultaneously was committing troops to help the British in Malaysia and the Americans in Vietnam."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Australia's willingness to enter the War in Vietnam was captured in a remark made by then Prime Minister Harold Holt to U.S President Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1966.

[b]LYNDON B. JOHNSON:[/b] "When you're Prime Minister symbolically said in Washington when speaking of the crisis that faced our men on a faraway battle front at the moment that he would go all the way with LBJ, there wasn't a single American that felt that was new information. (applause)"

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] So why was Australia so willing to join America in the war in Vietnam?

Monash University Political Historian, Paul Strangio explains that it was the logical conclusion of Cold War thinking.

[b]PAUL STRANGIO:[/b] "There was a tendency to see much of the trouble, particularly to Australia's north, because that's where much of the sort of post-war upheavals were occurring in that context. So they were part of if you like a monolithic communist design that had to be stopped by the Western nations, led by the United States. Anchored to that was Australia's deeper anxieties about the region stretching back of course into the 19th century. And in again in that post-Second World War period those anxieties had been nourished, the number of upheavals, China falling to communism, particularly I think Indonesia under the leadership of Sukarno and what was seen as the growing control of communism over Indonesia. So there were a whole lot of trouble spots and the fear that again that this was almost a seamless communist design and it had to be stopped somewhere. And by the early 1960s Vietnam became the place, the line in the sand to be drawn.

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] So really you could say it was Australia looking to rich and powerful friends in the US to provide our security blanket in the region here?

[b]PAUL STRANGIO:[/b] That's right, one qualification has to be made, it wasn't as simple as the Australian government of the time currying favour and blindly following the United States. Australia actively encouraged the US involvement in the Vietnam War behind the scenes, because of the belief that you had to almost interpose US power between Australia and Asia, and therefore anything that would deepen both strategic, military, economic American interests in the region was a good thing. And so we actively encouraged the growing US involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] You're listening to Radio Australia's series AUSTRALIA NOW - Program 12 AUSTRALIA's PLACE IN THE WORLD.

The election, in 1972, of a Labor Government led by Gough Whitlam saw the final withdrawal of Australia's military presence in Vietnam and the development of a more independent foreign policy stance.

Paul Strangio, again…

[b][b]PAUL STRANGIO:[/b][/b] "President Richard Nixon in 1971 enunciated what was known as 'The Nixon Doctrine' in which he made very clear that the US was unlikely to in the foreseeable future to commit to any military engagement on the Asian mainland and that secondly, Asian nations and the Asia Pacific region would have to be more self-sufficient in defence. So the very rationale that Australia had been pushing America into Vietnam, Nixon was backing away from that, and secondly there was the growing rapprochement with China around that time. And into that came the Whitlam government, and it was able to position itself in that context as opening up new directions for Australian foreign policy making, which at times put it on a course, not necessarily a collision course, but certainly some level of tension with the United States."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Monash University's Paul Strangio, who wrote a biography of Gough Whitlam's deputy and trade minister Jim Cairns, called 'Keeper of the Faith.'

Gough Whitlam had been the first Australian political leader to visit Peking in 1971. The following year, Australia established diplomatic relations with China though Australia had been trading wool and grain as early as the nineteenth century: trade links that were re-invigorated in the early nineteen seventies.

Gough Whitlam made a second visit to Peking in 1973…

[b]GOUGH WHITLAM:[/b] "Australia is moving in a new direction in its relationships with the world and specifically with the region in which Australia inevitably belongs. The course that we are setting is already clear and committed; our concern is no longer exclusively with nations in far removed areas of the globe. Now, our concern is with all nations and particularly those with whom we share a common environment and common interests and with whom we seek relationships of equality. We look to a future in which over-emphasis on particular associations will no longer distort the proper relationships which should exist between Australia and her neighbours."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] So did the end of the Cold War in the eighties and the phenomenal growth of the Asian Tiger economies prompt Australia to turn its attention from battle-fields to marketplace?

David Goldsworthy, again…

[b][b]DAVID GOLDSWORTHY:[/b][/b] "You might say that if Asia hadn't boomed economically in the way that it did through the agency of the Tiger countries and all that, we would have probably been much less interested in Asia than we actually were. It was so important by the 80s and 90s to engage in economic diplomacy in the era of globalisation, as distinct from the essentially security perceptions, strategic perceptions we had of Asia in the Cold War period of the 50s and 60s. So you got all these things happening at once, you got globalisation, you got rapid economic growth in the Tiger economies for all sorts of reasons, you had the end of the Cold War; it just opened the horizons for Australia as for other countries in an unprecedented way, and the focus on economics and trade will not go away. So although you might say, and I think say simplistically, that for a long time our perceptions of Asia were conditioned primarily by Cold War strategic concerns, so that we saw Asia as a battlefield in which Western powers of which we were one, in a subordinate role, but of which we were one, did battle with the communist powers. And then that all stopped and we had the transition from battlefield to marketplace and Asia was a place where you traded. You might say that happened, I say it's simplistic, but in a very broad sense that kind of alteration in our situation was a reality. But never let it be said that any government, not the Australian government, not the current Australian government, never let it be said that the government would lose sight of security and strategic imperatives altogether. And we of course feel that very, very strongly in our foreign policy today when terrorism is such a key issue, and where there is prospect of armed conflict in other parts of the world. All that will have to remain critically important in the country's external relations."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] The Australian Prime Minister, John Howard was in the U.S at the time of the September 11th terrorist attack…

[b]PRIME MINISTER JOHN HOWARD:[/b] "September 11th was a defining event. It demonstrated the appalling means that terrorists now have at their disposal to inflict unimaginable casualties with evil precision. The attack was designed not only to shatter our faith in the ability to live our lives in a free and open manner; it was also designed to shake the world's economic foundations. The world including Australia must respond."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] While Australians shared the Prime Minister's horror at the September 11th attack in 2001, the Government's willingness to join the U.S and British military involvement in Iraq, eighteen months later, caused much disquiet not least among some former Australian diplomats.

Richard Woollcott has advised seven Australian Prime Ministers and twelve foreign ministers and was Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade between 1988 and 1992.

His autobiography, THE HOT SEAT traces the evolution of Australia's foreign policies since 1952, and especially its engagement with Asia.

Richard Woollcott is concerned that by turning so sharply toward the United States, the Government has given new life to Asian perceptions that Australia is an Anglo-American outpost not all that comfortable with the Region.

[b]RICHARD WOOLLCOTT:[/b] "I travel quite a lot in the Region and I think there is a perception growing up that in some way we have sort of stepped back from the very close and constructive engagement that we'd built up with most of the East Asian countries through the 80s and into the early 90s. I think there's several reasons for that, one is the perception that we've rebalanced our foreign policy and become much more closely aligned with the United States policies than we have been in the past, manifested in the decision to send forces to Iraq, and we did that of course with only the United States itself and the United Kingdom. And I think that has done two things, it may have given new life to the perception that we really were an Anglo-American outpost, not all that comfortable in the region of the world in which we are situated. I think that's unfortunate. The other thing, which is probably not true, but there's a perception in some quarters that this is seen as some sort of act against Islam."

[b]ALISON BROINOWSKI:[/b] "I agree with Dick and it's not just because he used to be my boss. This is an impression that has been around for a very long time, indeed ever since the 1940s, when Australia refused to join the non-aligned movement because of our alliance with the United States and indeed with Britain. But it has incrementally been solidified in the region, if I may put it that way, perhaps most of all by our insistence all the time that we must keep the United States involved militarily in the Region."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Alison Broinowski, is a former cultural attaché and diplomat whose book, ABOUT FACE - Asian Accounts of Australia, was published shortly after Richard Woollcott's autobiography.

[b]ALISON BROINOWSKI:[/b] "After September the 11th there was no need for the Prime Minister to invoke the ANZUS alliance, even though he happened to have been in New York at the time and it powerfully affected him obviously. He didn't need to say we will go with you wherever it takes to do whatever you have to do against this dastardly enemy. He didn't have to do that, that is not an obligation under the ANZUS alliance. Secondly after Bali, which was clearly an attack directed at Australians and other western tourists, we had a golden opportunity to pull back from the commitment we had already made to go into Iraq. We could have said to the United States look, you must understand that we now have evidence of a very tangible threat on our own doorstep, a very difficult situation, one which if we don't handle it correctly could result in further threats to us and to the safety of our citizens and to our relationships with countries in the region. We could have said we don't want to be portrayed as attacking a Muslim country, for the obvious reasons, and therefore we won't send our small contingent of two-thousand people to Iraq, and you won't lose the war as a result. That was an unloseable war in the first place. In fact I think Dick has said elsewhere that it's perfectly possible to stand up to a friend and point out your differences with them when you think that's appropriate.

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] So just to sum up Australia's decision to strengthen the Alliance really brings into question do you think in the eyes of Asian leaders our ability to act independently with Asia on those occasions when that might be necessary in the future?

[b]ALISON BROINOWSKI:[/b] I'm sure that that's true. In fact I think we've made it very clear how we would act and that message has got through in every capital in the region. There may be some in the region in Singapore, possibly in Seoul and in Tokyo where that is an acceptable message, there are other capitals where it would be less so, and of course everyone has different views about these things. But as far as Australia's independence is concerned I think everybody in the region must be thinking that we've given the game away. And in fact I know that that is the case at the United Nations, that people are saying hey, where is Australia? Australia used to have an independent voice or at least a voice of its own on various issues. We appear to have abandoned that totally."

[b]SUE SLAMEN:[/b] Former diplomat Alison Broinowski whose book is called ABOUT FACE - Asian Accounts of Australia.

And - next week - the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard

takes part in a different kind of QUESTION TIME outside of the National Parliament when he takes questions about the world since September 11th from senior secondary school children from both Australia and the United States.

(MONTAGE OF STUDENT QUESTIONS)

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "Now to my first question to you Prime Minister…

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "Did this raise any moral concerns in your mind?"

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "Did you in any way feel responsible…"

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "How did that make you feel?"

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "What made you choose…"

[b]STUDENT:[/b] "What moral issues did you personally struggle with?"

[b]SUE SLAMENT:[/b] Till then bye from me - Sue Slamen and my thanks to Ryan Egan for Technical Production and the National Centre for Australian Studies at Monash University for academic advice.
[/quote]

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不错不错 老大 我顶了`

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[url]mms://media4.abc.net.au/ra/australia/media/an12.wma[/url]

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回复 #3 城市童话 的帖子

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回复 #4 城市童话 的帖子

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1212

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